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Abstract—If deployments of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANETs) are to become common outside of purely experimental
settings, protocols operating such MANETs must be able to
preserve network integrity, even when faced with careless or ma-
licious participants. A first step towards protecting a MANET is
to analyze the vulnerabilities of the routing protocol(s), managing
the connectivity. Understanding how these routing protocols can
be exploited by those with ill intent, countermeasures can be
developed, readying MANETs for wider deployment and use.
One routing protocol for MANETs, developed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a multicast routing protocol
for efficient data dissemination, is denoted “Simplified Multicast
Forwarding” (SMF). This protocol is analyzed, and its vulnera-
bilities described, in this paper.
SMF consists of two independent components: (i) duplicate
packet detection and (ii) relay set selection, each of which
presents its own set of vulnerabilities that an attacker may
exploit to compromise network integrity. This paper explores
vulnerabilities in each of these, with the aim of identifying attack
vectors and thus enabling development of countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network integrity in wired, multi-hop networks is largely
preserved by physically controlling access to the communica-
tions channel between routers: know thy peers, know which
behavior to expect from thy peers, trust thy peers – and be
able to disconnect thy peers if they show not worthy of that
trust. In a MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated
over wireless interfaces, such is less obvious: physical access
to the media between routers is not delimited by a cable, but
is available to anyone within transmission range; the network
topology is time-varying, either due to router mobility or due
to time-varying characteristics of the channel; traffic is often
retransmitted over the same wireless interface as the one over
which it was received. Consequently, MANET protocols are
conceived to manage conditions where less – or no – a-
priori structure is present between peers, and are exposed to
characteristics not commonly found in classic wired networks.
This exposure also renders MANET protocol more vul-
nerable to attacks, although two things shall be noted. First,
MANET protocols by way of their lack of a-priori infras-
tructure knowledge and lack of physical access control to
the communications channel are simply “exposing” and ren-
dering more easily exploitable vulnerabilities already present
in classic networks (e.g., such as injecting rogue traffic in
a network). Second, MANET protocols having to manage
specific characteristics (e.g., retransmission of traffic on an
interface over which it was received), introduces new, specific
protocol mechanisms, which may be open to attacks.
A. Background and History
The “Simple Multicast Forwarding” (SMF) protocol [1]
is a multicast routing protocol for MANET-wide efficient
broadcasting, employing reduced relay sets for decreasing
the number of redundant retransmissions of a data packet.
Reduced relay sets so used were introduced in and stan-
dardized for IP networks by way of the Optimized Link
State Routing Protocol (OLSR [2]) in 2003, where such
were used for substantially reducing the protocol overhead
incurred by diffusion of routing protocol control traffic (link
state advertisements, in [2] denoted “TC messages”). The
reduced relay set mechanism in OLSR is based on Multi-
Point Relays (MPRs) [3]. This concept was retained and used
in an extension of OSPF for MANET areas [4]. The reactive
MANET routing protocol AODV [5] also uses MANET-wide
broadcast of its control traffic (route requests). [6] showed that
using MPRs for flooding such control traffic resulted not just in
reduced channel load, but also in shorter unicast paths. Other
experimental routing protocols, including [7] and [8], have
used different relay set selection mechanisms, and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is standardizing the MANET
routing protocol OLSRv2 [9], retaining the MPR concept.
The success of such reduced relay sets for protocol control
traffic diffusion lead to investigations into using such also for
user data traffic, including [10] and [11], ultimately leading
to the IETF proposing development of SMF [1] as an experi-
mental protocol.
B. SMF Overview
SMF provides basic IP multicast routing for MANETs. It
consists of two main components: multicast “Duplicate Packet
Detection” (DPD) and “Relay Set Selection” (RSS).
1) Multicast Duplicate Packet Detection (DPD): DPD is
used as part of the forwarding process to check if an incom-
ing packet has been previously received (and forwarded) –
and therefore should be dropped – or not. In MANETs, as
illustrated in figure 1, duplicate packets are a common fact of
life: router n1 is retransmitting a broadcast packet received
from router n0 on the same interface as the one over which
it was received, so as to ensure receipt also by router n2 –
causing router n0 to receive the packet a second time.
N2N1N0
Figure 1. The need for duplicate detection: retransmission over the same
interface as a packet was received.
DPD is achieved by a router maintaining a record of
recently processed multicast packets, and comparing received
multicast packets herewith. A duplicate packet detected is
silently dropped and not inserted into the forwarding path of
that router, nor delivered to an application. DPD, as proposed
by SMF, supports both IPv4 and IPv6 and for each suggests
two duplicate packet detection mechanisms: 1) header content
identification-based DPD (I-DPD), using packet headers, in
combination with flow state, to estimate temporal uniqueness
of a packet, and 2) hash-based DPD (H-DPD), employing
hashing of selected header fields and payload for the same
effect.
2) Relay Set Seletion: RSS produces a reduced relay set
for use when relaying information across the MANET. SMF
supports the use of several relay set algorithms, including E-
CDS (Essential Connected Dominating Set), S-MPR (Source-
based Multi-Point Relay), or MPR-CDS. Those algorithms are
based on localized election, derived from those explored for
efficient topology diffusion in MANET routing protocols.
C. Statement of Purpose
While multicast protocols and efficient flooding mechanisms
are well studied for performance and convergence properties,
little work considers also security issues and implications of
the protocols in use – which assume that the routers in the
networks can be “trusted” to perform properly. In any deploy-
ment scenario, however, this assumption cannot be taken at
face value: the “accessibility” of a wireless communications
channel may open access to malicious routers attempting to
participate in the network – or an otherwise non-malicious
router may simply be misconfigured.
If deployments of MANETs are to become common outside
experimental settings, protocols operating in such networks
must be resilient to such malice or misconfiguration. A first
step towards such resilience is to understand the vulnerabilities
of a given protocol and identify probable attack vectors hereon.
This paper analyses SMF in order to understand its vul-
nerabilities. Various threats, from accidental misbehavior of
routers or from intentionally malicious attackers, are studied,
and threat sources, threat actions, threat consequences, etc. are
explored. While the study is generally based on SMF, the com-
ponents of SMF, such as duplicate packet detection and relay
set selection, are common in other multicast routing protocols,
and may therefore be also more generally applicable.
While the paper has the ambition of being thorough, in
matters of security it is prudent to be explicit to not claim
completeness of an analysis.
D. Paper Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
section II, threats to DPD are first discussed. Possible attacks
to the Relay Set Selection Vector (RSSV), which is used for
identify different types of RSS algorithms, are presented in
section III. The general threats to RSS are presented in section
IV. The paper is concluded in section V.
II. THREATS TO DUPLICATE PACKET DETECTION
The DPD mechanism is based on a unique identity check
of the incoming packets. A router needs to record a history of
processed multicast packets so as to ensure that a given packet
is processed and forwarded at most once – which entails that
such history must be maintained for at least the maximum
network traversal time of a packet. However, neither IPv4 nor
IPv6 contains mechanisms for uniquely identifying a given
packet. SMF introduces two mechanisms compensating this:
I-DPD and H-DPD. This section discusses attacks on each of
these, as well as the consequences on protocol operation that
such may have.
A. Identification-based DPD (I-DPD)
For I-DPD, a DPD identifier in the packet header is used
for identification of a packet. In case of fragmented packets,
and packets using IPsec, the contained fragment and packet
sequence numbers can be used. When neither is present, an
additional identifier in the packet header is needed. SMF
proposes an IPv6 header option to this effect, recognizing that
adding such IP packet header information is not supported for
IPv4.
The identification of a packet is, then, based on the source
IP address and the sequence number (from IPsec, fragment
number or header option). In this way, when each intermediate
router receives a packet, it can determine if the packet has been
received before.
1) Pre-play Attack: If a malicious router can obtain the
(source IP, sequence number) of a packet, it can inject (invalid)
packets with exactly the same identification information into
the network. As such an invalid packets propagates through
the network, if arriving before the valid packet with same
identification information, this valid packets will be discarded
as a duplicate. If further sequence numbers are predictable, a
malicious router can inject invalid packets with valid sequence
numbers in advance, ensuring that subsequent valid packets are
discarded as duplicates.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a pre-play attack. Router a
is the source and generates a multicast packet with sequence
number n. When the malicious router X receives the packet,
it injects an invalid packet with the same sequence number n.
Routers which receive the invalid packet first will discard sub-
sequent arrivals of the valid packet. The consequence hereof
depends on the network topology: as depicted in figure 2, the
attack might not affect routers that are farther away from
the malicious router than they are from the source router
(i.e., routers e and h), as the valid packet might reach those
routers first. For routers closer to the attacker than to the source
(i.e., router g and f ), the invalid packet will be received first,
causing subsequently arriving valid packets to be dropped. For
routers with equal distance (router c and d), it depends on the
link status and the transmission of the routers.
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Figure 2. Pre-play attack: X is a malicious router, which generates invalid
packets with valid sequence numbers.
When the succession of sequence numbers from a source
is predictable, a malicious router can, upon having observed a
valid packet being generated by a legitimate router, conduct a
pre-play attack by injecting invalid packets with not-yet-used-
but-soon-to-be-used sequence numbers. As shown in figure 3,
if an incremental algorithm is used for generating sequence
numbers, X can thereby prohibit corresponding valid packets
from attaining the part of the network reachable from X
without passing through a. The following packets from a with
seq = n+ 1, seq = n+ 2, etc, will be regarded as duplicate
packets and discarded.
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Figure 3. Pre-play attack by predicting sequence number. X is a malicious
router, which generates invalid packets with predicted sequence number.
Another possible pre-play attack is based on the Time-to-
Live (TTL) or hop limit field1. As routers only forward packets
1Henceforth, TTL is used indiscriminately for both TTL and hop-limit.
with TTL > 1, a malicious router can forward an otherwise
valid packet, while drastically reducing the TTL hereof. This
will inhibit recipient routers from later forwarding the same
multicast packet, even if received with a different TTL –
essentially a malicious router thus can instruct its neighbors
to block forwarding of valid multicast packets. As the TTL
of a packet is intended to be manipulated by intermediaries
forwarding it, classic methods such as signatures are typically
calculated with setting TTL fields to some pre-determined
value (e.g., 0) – such is for example the case for IPsec
Authentication Headers‘[12] – rendering such an attack more
difficult to both detect and counter. If the malicious router has
access to a “wormhole” through the network (a directional
antenna, a tunnel to a collaborator or a wired connection,
allowing it to bridge parts of a network otherwise distant) it
can make sure that the packets with such an artificially reduced
TTL arrive before their unmodified counterparts.
Figure 4 illustrates an example of this attack, with X being
the malicious router. On receiving a packet with TTL = 63
and seq = n, X broadcasts the same packet, but with an
artificially reduced TTL = 1. For routers near X, such as c, d,
and e, if they receive the packet with the artificially reduced
TTL before the valid packet arrives, the valid packet will be
discarded. If a wormhole between X and a distant router i
exists, X can inject the packet with the artificially reduced
TTL to i, and to the part of the network reachable through i –
which would subsequently discard later arriving valid packets.
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Figure 4. Pre-play attack based on TTL values. X is the malicious router
which forwards the packets with reduced TTL values.
2) Sequence Number Attack: In a pre-play attack, a mali-
cious router makes use of the DPD mechanism to force other
routers to discard otherwise valid packets – thus preventing
these from reach parts of the network. A malicious router can
also seek to disable DPD, by modifying the sequence number
in packets that it forwards. Thus, routers will not be able
to detect an actual duplicate packet as a duplicate – rather,
they will treat them as new packets, i.e., process and forward
them. The consequence of this attack is an increased channel
load, the origin of which appears to be a router other than the
malicious router.
In figure 5, when the malicious router X receives the packet
(seq = n) from router a, it simply modifies the sequence
number to n + i, and sends it back to the network. Router c
will not be able to detect the duplicate packet, which should
be discarded.
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Figure 5. Sequence number attack. X is the malicious router and modifies
the sequence number to disturb duplicate packet detection
[1] proposes use of IPsec sequence numbers as packet
identifiers. If IPsec is used, authentication and integrity of the
packets is usually assumed protected. In a MANET environ-
ment, the usage of IPsec is still not well defined – problems
include key distribution mechanisms, suitable cryptographic
algorithms and the use of IPsec for multicast. Furthermore,
to the best of the authors knowledge, few deployments of
MANETs employ IPsec. Therefore, this paper does not con-
sider the usage of the IPsec options as presented in [1].
B. Hash-based DPD (H-DPD)
In H-DPD, a hash of the non-mutable header fields, options
fields and data payload is used as identifier of a packet,
replacing explicit sequence numbers. Each packet is, thus,
uniquely identified by the IP address of the source of the
packet, and this hash-value. When a source host generates
a packet, or when a gateway ingresses the packet into the
MANET, it calculates the hash-value hereof. In case the source
host or gateway identifies that it recently has generated or
injected a packet with the same hash-value, it inserts a “Hash-
Assist Value (HAV)” IPv6 header option into the packet,
shown in figure 6, generated such that calculating the hash
also over this HAV will render the resulting value unique.
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                ...              |0|0|0| OptType | Opt. Data Len |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |1|    Hash Assist Value (HAV) ...
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6. The Hash Assist Value header option in H-DPD mode
Note that the hash value in SMF is applied only to provide
a low probability of collision, and is specifically not used
for cryptographic or authentication purposes. Also note that
threats, similar to those discussed in section II-A continue
to apply for when using H-DPD. One advantage of H-DPD
over I-DPD may be, however, that as the hash-value is
calculated also over the data payload of the packets, predicting
subsequent hash-values and conducting a pre-play attack is
somewhat harder.
Introducing a header option, however, also introduces a
potential vulnerability: the HAV header option is only used
when the source or the ingressing router detects that a pre-
viously generated packet has an identical hash value as this
packet. A malicious router which discovers the existence of a
HAV header in a packet can therefore conclude that a hash
collision is possible if the HAV header is absent. Thus, it
needs to simply remove the HAV header before retransmitting
the packet, which may cause the packet to be dropped by
recipients. Again, in doing so the malicious router causes the
packet to be dropped not by itself, but by other routers in the
network.
As shown in figure 7, a is the source router and X is the
malicious router. At the source a, it generates a packet p, and
stores the corresponding hash h(p) = x in its DPD cache.
The following packet p′ generated, has the same hash as the
previous packet, i.e. h(p′) = h(p) = x. The source router a
is able to detect the hash collision by comparing it with the
records in its DPD cache. Therefore, a adds an HAV header
as shown in figure 6, to avoid a possible collision by having
a new hash value h(p′ + HAV ) = x′. When the malicious
router X receives packet p′, it can conclude that a collision
might happen by removing the HAV header. On receiving
packet p at router b, a record with hash h(p) = x is saved in
the DPD cache. The consequence is that packet p′ cannot be
distinguished by router b after the HAV header being removed
because it has the same hash h(p′) = x.
a x b
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Figure 7. Attack based on the HAV field: The malicious router X produces
a hash collision by removing the HAV field.
Similarly, a malicious router can disrupt DPD by adding an
HAV header option to a packet. This modified packet cannot
produce the same hash value as the original packet, so it cannot
be detected as a duplicate packet. This is similar to the attack
in I-DPD, where a malicious router can change the sequence
number for the same effect.
In figure 8, router a forwards the packet p with h(p) = x to
router b and x. The malicious router X, instead of forwarding
the original packet unmodified to b, adds an HAV header
option with hash h(p+HAV ) = x′ 6= x. The router b is unable
to detect the duplicate packet and processes and forwards it
as a new packet.
Another possible attack for a malicious router is to transmit
many packets with identical payload and IP header within a
short time interval (“beacons”). This has several implications
when H-DPD is used: (i) similar to a “jamming” attack, the
increased load on the channel may lead to increased number of
collisions of data and control traffic packets. (ii) An (adjacent)
router receiving such a beacon has to calculate and add a
HAV header option to the packet header. This operation is
time-consuming, and the packet has to be stored while the
header option is generated. If a large number of beacons is
received by a router, memory and CPU resources may thus
ax
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Figure 8. Attack by adding a HAV header option: The malicious router X
disables duplicate packet detection by adding a HAV header option.
be exhausted by this “Denial of Service” attack. (iii) When a
packet is retransmitted by the adjacent router, an entry is stored
in the hash cache for some amount of time. A large number
of beacons within a short time may lead to an overflow of that
buffer. Depending on what cache management is used, older –
possibly “legitimate” – hash entries may be dropped from the
cache, leading to an effective deactivation of the hash-based
DPD mechanism.
III. THREAT TO RELAY SET SELECTION VECTOR (RSSV)
Reduced Relay Set Selection (RSS) in SMF is achieved by
distributed algorithms that dynamically calculate a topological
Connected Dominating Set (CDS). Such algorithms are gen-
erally based on the presence of a neighbor discovery protocol,
such as the “Neighborhood Discovery Protocol” (NHDP) [13],
providing 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information. The
relay set is then computed by using one from among a set
of possible algorithms, such as E-CDS, S-MPR, etc. These
algorithms are not interoperable, hence routers in a MANET
must communicate to their neighborhood which algorithm(s)
they respectively support. To this end, [1] defines a “Relay
Set Selection Vector” (RSSV), by way of message and address
block TLVs [14] to be used with the NHDP HELLO message
exchange, allowing a router to declare which RSS algorithms
it and its immediate neighbors support2.
In SMF, two TLV types are defined for RSS algorithms:
• An SMF message TLV type, which is used to identify the
existence of an SMF instance operating in conjunction
with NHDP.
• An SMF address block TLV type, which is used to share
the RSS algorithm configuration information among 2-
hop neighbors.
In both TLVs, a value is assigned to represent each RSS
algorithm.
A. RSSV Spoofing
Given the fact that there may be different RSS algorithms
operating concurrently in the same network, a router will have
to select relay sets according to compatibility of the algorithms
2While several RSS are supported in the same network, it is not clearly
specified in the current revision of SMF [1] whether a router can concurrently
support several different RSS at the same time.
operating in its immediate and 2-hop neighborhoods. A poten-
tial attack is, therefore, if a router – intentionally or otherwise
– share false RSSV information for itself or for its neighbors.
For example, in figure 9, router a is about to select its relays.
The following RSS algorithms are used in different routers:
• E-CDS: router b, d, e
• S-MPR: router c, f, g
• MPR-CDS: router h
All routers, faithfully, declare their RSSV. Based on the
messages from routers b, h and c, router a learns what
algorithms are supported by both its direct neighbors and its
2-hop neighbors. This allows router a to observe that while
router h provides topological coverage to all of the 2-hop
routers (d, e, f, g), router h runs an RSS algorithm different
from all of d, e, f, g. Therefore, if a selects h as relay, h may
not be able to select relays among d, e, f, g and thus packet
forwarding beyond d, e, f, g would not happen. Router a also
learns that router b runs the same RSS algorithm as the 2-
hop neighbors d, e, reachable via b – and that router c runs
the same RSS algorithm as the 2-hop neighbors f, g, reachable
via c. Router a can therefore select b and c as relays, knowing
that both of these will be able to not only provide coverage
to all 2-hop neighbors, but also be able to select proper relays
among these 2-hop neighbors.
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Figure 9. Relay set selection considering RSSV: Router a makes the decision
based on the RSSV declared by TLVs.
A malicious router, spoofing the RSSV of its 2-hop neigh-
bors, is shown in figure 10: X declares itself with RSSV=MPR-
CDS in message TLVs, and further declares that d, e, f, g
have RSSV=MPR-CDS. Thus, router a will choose X as sole
relay: from the information available to a, X provides optimal
topological coverage of the 2-hop neighborhood – and by
running the same RSS as (declared for) all 2-hop neighbors,
should be able to also do proper relay set selection with
these. As a consequence, X will “take control” of the multicast
traffic in its neighborhood – in this case, be able to prohibit
b and c from being selected as relays and, thus, if X isnot
actually forwarding traffic or performing RSS, disrupt network
connectivity.
Finally, X might simply declare that all other routers have
(only) RSSV=CF, classical flooding, thus degrading the net-
work performance to that of a simple flooding domain.
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d: RSSV=MPR-CDS
e: RSSV=MPR-CDS
f: RSSV=MPR-CDS
g: RSSV=MPR-CDS
Figure 10. Attack on the RSSV to disrupt the relay set selection: The
malicious router X spoofs the RSSV of d, e, f, g.
B. RSSV Indirect Jamming
In a neighbor discovery based mechanism, a malicious
router can intentionally and frequently alter the information
declared – including the RSSV – so as to cause generation
of inordinate amounts of control traffic by legitimate routers.
Such indirect jamming is discussed in [15] for neighborhood
discovery and link state advertisement, and also applies for
the RSSV, which a malicious router may alter and signal
frequently, causing its neighborhood to launch (possibly com-
putationally intensive) RSS recalculations and signal selected
relay set (causing increased channel occupation) as well as the
change of its neighbor’s status.
As shown in figure 11, the malicious router X first declares
itself as RSSV=E-CDS at t0. Router a will signal the change
of its neighbor in its HELLO message at t1 upon receiving the
message from X. In a relatively short time, X advertises in a
HELLO that RSSV=S-MPR, and a link to another router b at
t1. When a receives this message at t2, it will believe that X
has changed its status, then calculate its MPR set and broadcast
a new HELLO message. The above action can be repeated to
consume the power of a and the bandwidth.
RSSV= E-CDS
x
aa
x
RSSV= S-MPR
x
aa
x
X is E-CDS X is S-MPR
MPRs: (X)
t0 t1 t2 t3
b
Figure 11. Indirect jamming in RSSV: The malicious router X changes the
declaration of its RSSV frequently to make router a generate more control
traffic.
IV. THREATS TO RELAY SET SELECTION
[1] provides a framework for RSS, without requiring the use
of any specific RSS algorithm. This section will, therefore,
not explore the vulnerabilities of a specific RSS algorithm,
but rather general threats to the framework of SMF relay set
selection.
A. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is a common and easy passive attack in a
wireless environment. Once a packet is transmitted, any suit-
able transceiver can potentially obtain a copy, for immediate or
later decoding. Neither the source nor intended destination can
detect this. As previously indicated, SMF uses a neighborhood
discovery protocol for providing each router with 1-hop and 2-
hop topological information. A malicious router can eavesdrop
on the NHDP message exchange and thus learn this local
topology information, as well as some source and destination
addresses of data packets transmitted.
Eavesdropping will not have direct threat to the network
nor to SMF, but it can provide crucial network information
such as identity of communicating routers, link characteristic,
router configuration, etc., enabling other attacks.
B. Message Timing Attack
As NHDP is used to make relay set selection decisions, vul-
nerabilities of this protocol also affect SMF operation. NHDP
control messages define two types of timing information:
• Validity time, the time upon receipt during which the
information contained within the message should be
considered valid.
• Interval time, the time after which the next control
message from the same router should be expected.
For validity time, since information contained in control
messages is considered valid only for the duration indicated,
an attacker can simply eavesdrop on NHDP messages from its
neighbors, then instantly replay a received such message – but
modified to have a low validity time, illustrated in figure 12.
Router b broadcasts a HELLO message with valiT ime = 6s.
Router a receives the messages and marks the link between
itself and b is valid for 6 seconds. X eavesdrops on the
messages, obtains the identity of router b, then transmits the
HELLO message with valiTime=0.1s. Receipt of this message
by a causes a to replace previously received link information,
and therefore consider the link between itself and b as invalid
after very short time (0.1 second). For SMF, this means that b
will not be selected as relay by a even it may provide good
connectivity to other parts of the network.
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Figure 12. Validity timing attack: The malicious router X spoofs b and
declares a short validity time of the link.
A similar threat is possible using the interval time, where
a malicious router can behave as described above and also
indicate a low interval time. The recipient of this message
will expect a subsequent control message within this very
short time – which will not arrive. As a consequence, the
recipient decreases the link quality, or may even discard this
link. Further vulnerabilities to the NHDP exist in uni-cast
routing protocol also, as described in [15].
C. Multicast Disruption
RSS algorithms are based on a router having topological
information describing its 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood.
Thus, a malicious routers can spoof the links to or identities of
other routers in the network, and thus disrupt connectivity and
prevent multicast traffic from reaching parts of the network.
Figure 13 gives an example hereof, by way of link spoofing.
The malicious router, X, eavesdrops on NHDP control traffic,
and learns of the existence of e and f as 2-hop neighbors by
way of b and c, respectively. X itself participates in NHDP,
however declares (spoofs) in its control messages that it, too,
has links to all neighbors of b and c – i.e.,declares the dotted
links in figure 13. When a is to select relays, it will choose X
as its relay – X which may, then, simply not re-transmit any
multicast traffic received and thereby disconnecting e and f
from a.
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Figure 13. Multicast disruption by link spoofing: X spoofs the link to e
and f.
A similar attack is possible by way of identity spoofing, as
indicated in figure 14. The malicious router, X, eavesdrop on
NHDP control traffic and learns of the existence of c as a 2-hop
neighbor by way of b. X itself then commences participating
in NHDP, but presenting itself under the same identity as b –
thus a will see c as a direct neighbor and not select b as relay.
As a consequence, c is not able to receive multicast traffic,
again being disconnected from the network.
a
x
b c
X spoofs the identify of c
Figure 14. Multicast disruption by node spoofing. X spoofs the identify of
router c to wipe c from the multicast domain
D. Broadcast Storm
In MANETs, a broadcast storm caused by classical flooding
is a serious problem because radio signals of two or more
adjacent routers transmitting at the same time are likely
to overlap. This can result in redundancy, contention and
collisions [16]. Avoiding broadcast storms is one of the reasons
why RSS algorithms are used – in SMF as well as in routing
protocols such as [2].
In contrast to the attacks described in section IV-C, a
malicious router may attack an SMF network by attempting to
degrade RSS so as to produce classic flooding, illustrated in
figure 15. Bold lines with arrows present the intended multicast
traffic if the RSS algorithm run properly: b, d, f, h are selected
as relays by a, and c, e, g, i just receive packets from a without
forwarding.
A malicious router X may disrupt this by overhearing NHDP
control traffic, thus learning of the 1-hop neighborhood of a. X
may, then, generate control messages performing both identity
spoofing and link-spoofing, pretending to be one of the 1-hop
neighbors of a (e.g., any or all of b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i) and
declare that links to non-existing routers e.g., z, x, y, v, w
exist for these, causing a to select more (or all) of its 1-hop
neighbors as relays, degrading into classic flooding.
X may overhear control messages from some of the 1-hop
neighbors of a and thus learn of their 2-hop neighborhoods
– and spoof links that it thus knows are non-existing. Such
would be the case for f and g, for example. For b and i, X
may not know what their 2-hop neighbors are, however may
“make an educated guess” when selecting links to spoof.
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Figure 15. The broadcast storm attack: The bold line with arrow represents
normal multicast traffic, and the dashed line the redundant traffic caused by
having all the 1-hop neighbors of a be selected as relays.
While this reduces network performance by disabling RSS
and producing classical flooding, the effect of this attack
is only local. Except if X has accomplices throughout the
network, b, c, d, e, f, g, h and i likely will be able to select
proper relay sets.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed vulnerabilities of the “Simple
Multicast Forwarding” (SMF) Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc
Networks. In addition to vulnerabilities inherited from its use
of NHDP for acquiring local topology information allowing
reduced relay set selection, SMF introduces two Duplicate
Packet Detection mechanisms, each introducing additional
vulnerabilities: disrupting network connectivity, as well as
allowing a malicious router to incite other routers to produce
unnecessary packet re-transmissions – thereby consuming pre-
cious channel resources.
SMF also provides a framework for enabling different relay
set selection algorithms, to be used within SMF. As such
algorithms may not be interoperable, this framework intro-
duces a signaling mechanism (RSSV) whereby a router shares
the algorithms it support itself – as well as the algorithms
supported by its neighbors. Intended to allow a router to select
its relays such that the RSS algorithms of these are compatible
with algorithms of its 2-hop neighbors, the RSSV also allows a
malicious router to present conflicting or incorrect information,
skewing relay set selection and possibly disrupting network
connectivity.
Using NHDP for acquiring local topology, SMF inherits
vulnerabilities of NHDP, such as eavesdropping, message
timing attack, which are also common in uni-cast protocols.
Additionally, SMF also introduces vulnerabilities by way of ,
link spoofing, node spoofing, etc., allowing a malicious router
to provoke connectivity disruption or a broadcast storm by
degrading even RSS behavior to classical flooding.
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